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Sixth Rule
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| Sixth Rule | | |||||||||||||
By: | | John Adams | | ||||||||||||
Date: | | 06/01/1788 | | ||||||||||||
Location: | | Learning Centre: Constitution, Freedom, History, Rights, Sovereignty | | ||||||||||||
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Sixth Rule. [quoting Nedham] 'That the people be continually trained up in the exercise of arms, and the militia lodged only in the people's hands, or that part of them which are most firm to the interest of liberty, and so the power may rest fully in the disposition of their supreme assemblies.'--The limitation to 'that part most firm to the interest of liberty,' was inserted here, no doubt, to reserve the right of disarming all the friends of Charles Stuart, the nobles and the bishops. Without stopping to enquire into the justice, policy, or necessity of this, the rule in general is excellent: all the consequences that our author draws from it, however, cannot be admitted. One consequence was, according to him, 'that nothing could at any time be imposed upon the people but by their consent,' that is, by the consent of themselves, 'or of such as were by them intrusted. As Aristotle tells us, in his fourth book of Politics, the Greek states ever had special care to place the use and exercise of arms in the people, because the commonwealth is theirs who hold the arms: the sword and sovereignty ever walk hand in hand together.' This is perfectly just. 'Rome, and the territories about it, were trained up perpetually in arms, and the whole commonwealth, by this means, became one formal militia. There was no difference in order between the citizen, the husbandman, and the soldier.' This was the 'usual course, even before they had gained their tribunes and assemblies; that is, in the infancy of the senate, immediately after the expulsion of their kings.' But why does our author disguise that it was the same under the [Roman] kings? This is the truth; and it is not honest to conceal it here. In the times of Tarquin, even, we find no standing army, 'not any form of soldiery;' -- 'nor do we find, that in after times they permitted a deposition of the arms of the commonwealth in any other way, till their empire increasing, necessity constrained them to erect a continued stipendiary soldiery abroad, in foreign parts, either for the holding or winning of provinces.' Thus we have the truth from [Nedham] himself; the whole people were a militia under the kings, under the senate, and after the senate's authority was tempered by popular tribunes and assemblies; but after the people acquired power, equal at least, if not superior to the senate, then 'forces were kept up, the ambition of Cinna, the horrid tyranny of Sylla, and the insolence of Marius, and the self[ish] ends of divers[e] other leaders, both before and after them, filled all Italy with tragedies, and the world with wonder.' Is this not an argument for the power of kings and senates, rather than the uncontroulable power of the people, when it is confessed that the two first used it wisely, and the last perniciously? The truth is, as he said before, 'the sword and sovereignty go together.' While the sovereignty was in the senate under the kings, the militia obeyed the orders of the senate given out by the kings; while the sovereignty was in the senate, under the consuls, the militia obeyed the orders of the senate given out by consuls; but when the sovereignty was lost by the senate, and gained by the people, the militia was neglected, a standing army set up, and obeyed the orders of the popular idols. 'The people, seeing what misery they had brought upon themselves, by keeping their armies within the bowels of Italy, passed a law to prevent it, and to employ them abroad, or at a convenient distance: the law was, that if any general marched over the river Rubicon, he should be declared a public enemy;' and in the passage of that river this following inscription 'was erected, to put the men of arms in mind of their duty: Imperator, sive miles, sive tyrannus armatus quisque, sistito vexillum, armaque deponito, nec citra hunc amnem trajicito; general, or soldier, or tyrant in arms, whosoever thou be, stand, quit thy standard, and lay aside thy arms, or else cross not this river.' But to what purpose was the law? Caesar knew the people now to be sovereign, without control of the senate, and that he had the confidence both of them and his army, and_cast the die,_ and erected 'praetorian bands, instead of a public militia; and was followed in it by his successors, by the Grand Signior, by Cosmus the first great duke of Tuscany, by the Muscovite, the Russian, the Tartar, by the French,' and, he might have added, by all Europe, who by that means are all absolute [monarchs], excepting England, because the late king Charles I, who attempted it, did not succeed; and because our author's 'Right Constitution of a Commonwealth' did not succeed: if it had, Oliver Cromwell and his descendants would have been emperors of Old England as the Caesars were of Old Rome. The militia and sovereignty are inseparable. In the English constitution, if the whole nation were a militia, there would be a militia to defend the crown, the lords, or the commons, if either were attacked: the crown, though it commands them, has no power to use them improperly, because it cannot pay or subsist them without the consent of the lords and commons; but if the militia are to obey a sovereignty in a single assembly, it is commanded, paid, subsisted, and a standing army too may be raised, paid, and subsisted, by the vote of a majority; the militia then must all obey the sovereign majority, or divide, and part follow the majority, and part the minority. This last case is civil war; but until it comes to this, the whole militia may be employed by the majority in any degree of tyranny and oppression over the minority. The constitution [of Britain] furnishes no resource or remedy; nothing affords a chance of relief but rebellion and civil war: if this terminates in favour of the minority, they will tyrannize in their turns, exasperated by revenge, in addition to ambition and avarice; if the majority prevail, their domination becomes more cruel, and soon ends in one despot. It must be made a sacred maxim, that the militia obey the executive power, which represents the whole people in the execution of the laws. To suppose arms in the hands of citizens, to be used at individual discretion, except in private self-defence, or by partial orders of towns, counties, or districts of a state, is to demolish every constitution, and lay the laws prostrate, so that liberty can be enjoyed by no man --it is a dissolution of the government. The fundamental law of the militia is, that it be created, directed, and commanded by the laws, and ever for the support of the laws. This truth is acknowledged by our author, when he says, 'The arms of the commonwealth should be lodged in the hands of that part of the people which are firm to its establishment.' <<John Adams, in this chapter, is reviewing a 1656 work by Marchamont Nedham (1620-1678), titled "The Excellency of a free State, or the right Constitution of a Commonwealth," from which Adams quotes extensively. Notice should be made especially of the last paragraph, in which Adams outlines his views on the two legitimate functions of the right to keep and bear arms, which are for private self-defense, and for enforcing the law as a member of the general militia, under the direction of a democratically elected government (as local as possible). Note also his earlier analysis of the dangers inherent in a democratic tyranny of the majority, and, in passing, an explanation of the ancient origin of the phrase "crossing the Rubicon.">> | | | ||||||||
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